Observing the letter, violating the spirit of halachah
This post was inspired by this one. So I think I'll just start with the same subject.
Tzniut/Modesty
I said it in the comments to that post and I'll say it again: Why can't we just use our brains? Is the point to follow the rules, which, according to some interpretations of halachah/Jewish religious law, say that a woman must cover her collarbone, elbows, and knees? Or is the point to be modest, which would prohibit a woman from wearing an outfit that conforms to all of the above rules but is skin-tight?
Kisui Rosh/Head-Covering (for married woman)
According to some interpretations of halachah, a married woman must cover at least part of her hair in public. I will grant you that Orthodox women employed in certain fields and/or under certain circumstances may find it advisable to cover their hair discretely by using a wig. But it seems to me that, if you can't tell that a married woman's hair is covered, what's the point?
A former boss of mine had it right. She discretely wore a wig every day, but not only was it not the same wig, she had wigs of two different lengths. This made it perfectly obvious to anyone who saw her for more than three days in a row that the hair we were seeing was not her real hair.
Yayin M'vushal (cooked [boiled] wine)
The rabbis forbade Jews to drink wine handled by a non-Jew (meaning that, if a non-Jew handled an opened bottle of wine or grape juice, it became forbidden for a Jew to drink from that bottle) in order to prevent too much socializing between Jews and non-Jews (and/or to prevent the accidental participation of Jews in the worship of "foreign" gods [Avodah Zarah] by non-Jews [Nochrim]). (See here.) Then they came up with the brilliant idea that, if the wine were boiled, anyone could handle the bottle and a Jew could still drink from it. So a measure that was originally designed to prevent interaction no longer does anything of the sort.
Bishul Yisrael
The rabbis forbade Jews to eat certain kosher foods when they were cooked by non-Jews, a measure which, if I understand it correctly, was yet another attempt to prevent too much fraternization. Then they got around that rule by saying that it was sufficient for a Jew to light the stove light, or, according to Sefardi Orthodox Jewish interpretation, it was sufficient for a Jew to stir the food in the pot and/or put the pot on the flame/stove light. (See here.) My understanding is that, at home, you can get around the prohibition to a limited extent by having your household and/or childcare helper reheat food in the microwave, since, halachically speaking, cooking in a microwave is not considered cooking. So, again, a measure that was originally promulgated to prevent excessive socializing between Jews and non-Jews no longer does any such thing.
Concerning Yayim M'vushal and Bishul Yisrael, I just don't get it. I recently read somewhere a statement that one should be careful not to abandon a tradition just because there's no longer a reason for it. Nu, can you think of a better reason to abandon a tradition?*
Concerning all of the practices described above, I would describe this sort of thinking as halachic hyprocrisy.
*Yeah, yeah, there's no logical reason given by the Torah for keeping kosher either, but at least the basic prohibitions of kashrut come straight from the Torah, not from the rabbis.
See also Bugged.
Wed., June 16, 2010, 5:36 PM note: The comment count is malfunctioning (for a change), so please check for further comments even if it appears that there aren't any. I missed a few, myself--will reply from home.
Tzniut/Modesty
I said it in the comments to that post and I'll say it again: Why can't we just use our brains? Is the point to follow the rules, which, according to some interpretations of halachah/Jewish religious law, say that a woman must cover her collarbone, elbows, and knees? Or is the point to be modest, which would prohibit a woman from wearing an outfit that conforms to all of the above rules but is skin-tight?
Kisui Rosh/Head-Covering (for married woman)
According to some interpretations of halachah, a married woman must cover at least part of her hair in public. I will grant you that Orthodox women employed in certain fields and/or under certain circumstances may find it advisable to cover their hair discretely by using a wig. But it seems to me that, if you can't tell that a married woman's hair is covered, what's the point?
A former boss of mine had it right. She discretely wore a wig every day, but not only was it not the same wig, she had wigs of two different lengths. This made it perfectly obvious to anyone who saw her for more than three days in a row that the hair we were seeing was not her real hair.
Yayin M'vushal (cooked [boiled] wine)
The rabbis forbade Jews to drink wine handled by a non-Jew (meaning that, if a non-Jew handled an opened bottle of wine or grape juice, it became forbidden for a Jew to drink from that bottle) in order to prevent too much socializing between Jews and non-Jews (and/or to prevent the accidental participation of Jews in the worship of "foreign" gods [Avodah Zarah] by non-Jews [Nochrim]). (See here.) Then they came up with the brilliant idea that, if the wine were boiled, anyone could handle the bottle and a Jew could still drink from it. So a measure that was originally designed to prevent interaction no longer does anything of the sort.
Bishul Yisrael
The rabbis forbade Jews to eat certain kosher foods when they were cooked by non-Jews, a measure which, if I understand it correctly, was yet another attempt to prevent too much fraternization. Then they got around that rule by saying that it was sufficient for a Jew to light the stove light, or, according to Sefardi Orthodox Jewish interpretation, it was sufficient for a Jew to stir the food in the pot and/or put the pot on the flame/stove light. (See here.) My understanding is that, at home, you can get around the prohibition to a limited extent by having your household and/or childcare helper reheat food in the microwave, since, halachically speaking, cooking in a microwave is not considered cooking. So, again, a measure that was originally promulgated to prevent excessive socializing between Jews and non-Jews no longer does any such thing.
Concerning Yayim M'vushal and Bishul Yisrael, I just don't get it. I recently read somewhere a statement that one should be careful not to abandon a tradition just because there's no longer a reason for it. Nu, can you think of a better reason to abandon a tradition?*
Concerning all of the practices described above, I would describe this sort of thinking as halachic hyprocrisy.
*Yeah, yeah, there's no logical reason given by the Torah for keeping kosher either, but at least the basic prohibitions of kashrut come straight from the Torah, not from the rabbis.
See also Bugged.
Wed., June 16, 2010, 5:36 PM note: The comment count is malfunctioning (for a change), so please check for further comments even if it appears that there aren't any. I missed a few, myself--will reply from home.
Labels: Kisui rosh (head-covering)
posted by Shira Salamone at 8:25 AM
41 Comments:
On Yayin Mevushal, I find that the effort involved in remembering to either buy only yayim mevushal, or at least to only serve yayin mevushal when necessary still does serve as a reminder that 'these people aren't exactly like me.' So I would claim the prohibition still works to some extent.
Alternatively I know some people who say that the original boiled wine was more like cough syrup, and that therefore they will not treat as mevushal any wine that is indistinguishable from uncooked wine. (This effectively means they don't drink wine outside the community, which restores the original purpose of the prohibition.)
The prohibition of wine has been a challenge throughout Jewish history. One of the few medieval era Jewish memoirs we have includes the author's description of his battle against the desire to frequent gentile taverns - there are periods of years in which he gives in, and other times in his life he manages to resist the urge.
"*Yeah, yeah, there's no logical reason given by the Torah for keeping kosher either, but at least the basic prohibitions of kashrut come straight from the Torah, not from the rabbis."
Shira, I thought, that as a Conservative Jew, you believed that the Torah was written by man, anyway, so what is the difference really between a Torah commandment and a Rabinnical one?
Also in terms of observing the letter but not the spirit, it seems that the C approach is to observe neither!
"We don't like the idea of bishul yisroel, so 'poof' it doesn't exist." Same with hair covering, etc. I have never heard or read any Conservative teshuva explaining WHY these things are not observed in the C community, they are just wished away with a waive of the hand.
Larry, you're saying that simply going out of one's way to buy yayin mevushal serves a positive purpose. That's an interesting point.
"Shira, I thought, that as a Conservative Jew, you believed that the Torah was written by man, anyway, so what is the difference really between a Torah commandment and a Rabinnical one?"
Oy. I don't claim to be consistent. :)
I guess I just prefer to go back to the original source on matters that complicate life. If the rabbis want to tell me to light candles on Sabbath and Festival evenings, or to tie my tzitzit (ritual fringes) a certain way, fine. But when they go beyond trying to ensure that I eat only foods that the original source (Torah sheh-bichtav/Written Bible) permits and start dictating who I can eat with, I get upset.
Regarding head covering there are certainly O sources who agree with you. Rav Ovadia Yosef forbids sheitels altogether, and the Satmar Chassidim require a sheitel that is obviously not human hair (a century ago they wore sheitels made of straw).
Sheitels were popularized by the late Lubavitcher Rebbe. He had several reasons for being lenient about the issue, but I think one important reason was he wanted to get women who weren't covering at all to cover. A nice wig was considered more acceptable by many women than a tichel (aka shmattah) or snood.
Bishul Yisrael: If I had unlimited legislative authority I would create the category of bishul palter, analgous to that of pat palter. Industrial food would not be forbidden because there is no risk of wanting to marry Sarah Lee's daughter.
Rabbi Herschel Schater (IIRC) also feels that would be a good rule but that it cannot be implemented at this time. I assume that is due to some combination of existing precedent and that the last thing we need at the moment is another fracture line in kashrut.
The undoing of a rule/halacha stems from Gemara Mesechta bietza page 5?
that a group of rabbis cant undo a decree by a previous group unless they are bigger and smarter. since that's difficult to prove, we just don't undo.
Regarding the origin of the rules, it is dangerous to assume total understanding of the implementation, even if stated. Have you investigated ALL sources, do all sources still exist? (think book burnings etc) To consider oneself absolute in knowledge, even in one subject is presumptuous.
Regarding hair covering that is a minhag as per community, the covering itself is old as the story of Korach.
Why people try to get a workaround is beyond me.
Maybe guilt.
"i am a good Jew"
loopholes were designed to keep torah within darcheihu darkay noam. In case of hardship not for daily use.
Noam
The idea that because you don't know what all the reasons may have been you shouldn't change a halacha isn't very convincing from a rationalist perspective. If you think that each mitzvah makes changes in worlds beyond ours sure. But if the rabbis made a change for rational reasons, even if we don't know what they were, and know when we look at the situation we don't see any reasons at all to support the change, then the fact that there might have been other reasons which don't apply is irrelevant.
For example, the rabbis forbade taking medicine on Shabbat because it might lead to grinding. That isn't really relevant to the way we take medicine today - the average person does not use a mortar and pestle to grind his drugs on the spot. If the rabbis also forbade it for the now lost reason that the aroma of the freshly ground spices might tempt us to cook, that reason is also irrelevant.
The legalist argument that we can't possibly have a contemporary court greater in numbers and wisdom than a preceeding court is a different issue, and considerably harder to argue with on its own terms.
Larry, I think the preference for sheitel-wearing is also location-related: In Israel, where so many women cover their heads, going to work in a scarf is no big deal, whereas in the Diaspora/Galut, wearing a scarf makes a woman conspicuous, not to mention, in a professional setting, conspicuously underdressed. I share your opinion that wearing a wig is a leniency for the benefit of women who would not cover their hair otherwise.
"Industrial food would not be forbidden because there is no risk of wanting to marry Sarah Lee's daughter."
:)
Everyone's looking over their shoulder--usually their right shoulder--and they're all afraid to make a move, even when it makes sense. Sad.
"The undoing of a rule/halacha stems from Gemara Mesechta bietza page 5?
that a group of rabbis cant undo a decree by a previous group unless they are bigger and smarter. since that's difficult to prove, we just don't undo."
The result, of course, Anon, is that very little gets undone. :(
"To consider oneself absolute in knowledge, even in one subject is presumptuous."
If you wish to make the case that I'm presumptuous because of my ignorance of halachah--as a Hebrew School grad. and a not particularly studious person, I've never even studied Chumash Rashi, much less Mishnah and/or Gemara--I have little choice but to plead guilty as charged.
"Why people try to get a workaround is beyond me."
Humph, you have even less sympathy for sheitel-wearers than I do. At least I consider professional issues in the Diaspora to be a legitimate reason for wearing a sheitel.
Anon 12:12, sorry I neglected to address the rest of your comment.
"Also in terms of observing the letter but not the spirit, it seems that the C approach is to observe neither!
"We don't like the idea of bishul yisroel, so 'poof' it doesn't exist." Same with hair covering, etc. I have never heard or read any Conservative teshuva explaining WHY these things are not observed in the C community, they are just wished away with a waive of the hand."
In all honesty, I don't understand very well how halachic decisions are made in the Conservative Movement . I'm pretty sure that we Conservs. are permitted to follow either a majority or a minority opinion. It's not clear, though, how topics of discussion are chosen. I have absolutely no idea whether the topic of bishul Yisrael was ever discussed.
That said, I reiterate my previous objection to the rule itself, which is that it has nothing to do with kashrut, and I don't appreciate it when the rabbis add rules on top of rules. What, kosher ingredients aren't enough--now I have to worry about who's cooking, too? No, my objection is not based on a serious study of halachah. It's based on my own opinion. I often wonder to what extent observant Jews are allowed to think for themselves.
"if the rabbis made a change for rational reasons, even if we don't know what they were, and know when we look at the situation we don't see any reasons at all to support the change, then the fact that there might have been other reasons which don't apply is irrelevant."
Amen!
"The legalist argument that we can't possibly have a contemporary court greater in numbers and wisdom than a preceeding court is a different issue, and considerably harder to argue with on its own terms."
If you accept that argument, then nothing can ever change. The Reconstructionist Movement and I have parted ways on many issues, but a belief that Judaism evolves is not one of them. The only thing that a belief in yeridat hadorot--that each generation is inferior in knowledge to the previous one, and, therefore, can't override its decisions--accomplishes is to freeze halachah in stone. It is my sincere belief that that's not the way that halachah is supposed to function.
Oops! Noam the Preacher, I'm sorry that I misattributed (to Anon.) the following comments of yours:
"The undoing of a rule/halacha stems from Gemara Mesechta bietza page 5?
that a group of rabbis cant undo a decree by a previous group unless they are bigger and smarter. since that's difficult to prove, we just don't undo."
""To consider oneself absolute in knowledge, even in one subject is presumptuous."
Thank you for contributing your thoughts, to which I've already responded.
Are Orthodox Jews allowed, under Halacha, to think for ourselves? Nearly completely except for an absolute rejection of Hashem, that's pretty much the main prohibited thought/belief, there might be a few extensions of that.
Now the ability to act on it is another matter. :)
Bishul Akum may feel dumb, and you are permitted to think that it's stupid. Doesn't change the obligatory nature of it. :)
My rule of thumb: if I think a rule makes sense, I look to be more stringent in that area. If I think a rule is stupid, I look to be more lenient. Nonetheless, my thoughts on the stupidity/intelligence of the rule doesn't change the obligatory nature of it.
Make sense?
It makes sense only if you buy into the system and prioritize the binding nature of halachah over your own perception of what makes sense and what does not. I'm too cussedly independent to do that--I prefer to act on what I think.
That said, if you *do* buy into the system, it makes sense to be more stringent regarding a law that you perceive to be intelligent and more lenient regarding a law that you perceive to be stupid.
For the record, I think that the whole head-covering requirement for married women is stupid. In the 21st century, when it's often considered perfectly acceptable, in general Western society, to wear tight and/or revealing clothing, naked hair is not likely to inspire anyone to want to get naked. (One of my pet peeves about halachah is that I think more of the rules should be adjustable depending on the era and/or location.) That said, *if* you believe that you're obligated to cover your hair (or, for a male, your head), I think that you should do so in a way that's noticeable, if circumstances allow, because looking different is the point, in my opinion. If blatant hair-covering (or head-covering) would have a negative effect on your employability and/or would put you at risk (as with wearing a kippah in public in France, these days), then being discrete is reasonable.
I suppose I just contradicted myself--if hair-covering is a stupid rule, then being meikil (lenient) about it shouldn't be a big deal. :)
On the other hand, the whole point of my post is that stupid rules should be changed or removed from the books, in my opinion. Observing dumb rules in a lenient fashion just doesn't "work" for me. I'd never make it as an Ortho.
Shira,
You also have to keep in mind that altough not all do, a significant majority of O Jews follow Rashi's opinion on the Gemarah that a married woman covering her hair is m'doraisa NOT d'Rabban, so it can not be "done away with due to modern times" etc.
Keep in mind, that even from the Orthdox perspective, there ARE areas of tzniut that according to some authorities the standards change depending on time, locale and community standards. For example some say it ok for women to be barefoot in places where the community generally deems it acceptable. However there are some aspects of modesty that are inviolable. Also, according to many halachic authorities, if Jews live in a non-Jewish society whose standards of modesty are more extreme than ours, we must uphold the stricter standard of the surrounding society.
Well, I guess I'm not a follower of Rashi.
I also find the whole notion of bare feet being deemed immodest a bit absurd in our modern age. What's so sexy about naked ankles, that, in some traditional communities, women have to wear socks under their sandals? Isn't the whole point of wearing sandals to be as close to barefoot as is manageable off of a sand surface? Why is going sock-free okay for guys? Socks are not like tops: women don't have any more to hide on their feet than men have--guys have toes, too. Men hanging around the trolley stop for a quick view of a female ankle usually hidden under a long skirt is so early-twentieth-century.
"Also, according to many halachic authorities, if Jews live in a non-Jewish society whose standards of modesty are more extreme than ours, we must uphold the stricter standard of the surrounding society."
Since I believe that modesty is a relatively term, dependent on local standards, that makes sense to me, though I'd hate to live in a place where the standard garb is a burka.
"Well, I guess I'm not a follower of
Rashi."
Rashi is NOT a chasidus/hashkafa variant that needs to be 'followed' Rashi is the foremost elucidifier of the Torah, even those that disagree with him (i.e. Ramban) go out of their way to give him the utmost respect, never saying "he's wrong" but rather saying, Rashi says yada yada1 but I feel that yada yada2 might be clearer.
Someone of todays day and age disagree with Rashi? laughable.
noam,
I'm guessing you're new here, but Shira isn't Orthodox. Heck, I'm Orthodox, and I don't "accept" everything that Rashi does or says, but then again, neither did his grandsons, who were among the Ba'alei Tosafot. For that matter, many Orthodox Jews do not hold that kisui rosh is d'oraita. The reference to isha sotah is an asmachta, at best.
I still find Shira most interesting when she's struggling to articulate her vision of a vibrant, observant non-orthodox movement, and less so when she is struggling with Orthodoxy (since she's not orthodox), but your statement about Rashi is one better suited for an audience that would be receptive to it. Most Conservative Jews (at least those who have heard of Rashi) would have little difficulty saying they don't follow Rashi.
Noam,
The fact that those that disagreed with Rashi had better manners than you doesn't elevate his stature. They probably also would have addressed you or Shira politely.
Rashi was an extremely prolific writer whose publications survived to the beginning of the printing press, which is a large factor in Rashi's influence.
I actually find a married woman's hair being covered being derived from the Sotah relatively compelling. I find a married woman's hair being covered being derived from Tzniut stupid.
In realty, the reason Sotah refers to women's hair being covered is because it was written in the middle east. In the middle east, women covered their hair, as did men, because it's REALLY REALLY hot out, so you wrap your hair up. They didn't go into a store and buy a hair tie, they grabbed a piece of cloth and tied their hair up.
Connecting hair as sensual post erotic awakening for married women is ridiculous and clearly an attempt to give a reason.
Women in the middle east covered their hard. Unmarried women probably did as well, except when "dancing around the Temple" or "in the vineyard" or whatever single young ladies did to attract husbands back then.
"even those that disagree with him (i.e. Ramban) go out of their way to give him the utmost respect,"
Noam, thank you for pointing out that I've violated my own rule by being disrespectful on my own blog. I apologize for any offense that I might have caused by not choosing my words more carefully. Rashi is most certainly worthy of my respect, despite any disagreement that I might have with his halachic opinions.
"I still find Shira most interesting when she's struggling to articulate her vision of a vibrant, observant non-orthodox movement,"
Thanks, JDub. I'd find it easier to do that if I had a vibrant, observant Conservative congregation within walking distance. :(
"and less so when she is struggling with Orthodoxy (since she's not orthodox),"
Guilty as charged.
"the reason Sotah refers to women's hair being covered is because it was written in the middle east. In the middle east, women covered their hair, as did men, because it's REALLY REALLY hot out, so you wrap your hair up."
Miami Al, a minor correction--the text (in Naso, Numbers chapter 5 verse 18) says not that the priest uncovered the woman's hair, but that he "let the hair of the woman's head go loose, u-fara et rosh ha-ishah." I read somewhere that this may actually mean that women tied their hair back, not necessarily that they covered it. Years ago, when I had hair long enough to wear it turned under (in the style formerly known as a page boy), I used to grow it longer every spring so that I could clip it up in the summer, since I couldn't tolerate having hair trailing down the back off my neck in 90-degree weather. I wouldn't be the least surprised to learn that the women (and men) of the ancient Middle East tied or clipped their hair back in hot weather. Maybe letting the hair of a woman suspected of adultery go loose was a way of making her literally sweat out her trial by ordeal.
I wouldn't be the least surprised to learn that the women (and men) of the ancient Middle East tied or clipped their hair back in hot weather. Maybe letting the hair of a woman suspected of adultery go loose was a way of making her literally sweat out her trial by ordeal.
The explanation I heard (which I find vivid and compelling, but unsupported by an evidence) is that the priest loosens and dishevels the sotah's hair, making it look like it would after relations.
Larry, that's an interesting theory on more than one count: Why would a priest wish to risk appearing interested in someone else's wife?
Also, does the hair-loosening segment of the ceremony of Sotah indicate that the rules of sh'mirat n'giah (not touching a member of the opposite sex other than one's spouse or close family member)did not exist at the time?
Why would a priest wish to risk appearing interested in someone else's wife?
Huh? It is part of the ceremony, done before the husband and I don't know who all else. I doubt anyone thought twice about what the priest was thinking...
Also, does the hair-loosening segment of the ceremony of Sotah indicate that the rules of sh'mirat n'giah (not touching a member of the opposite sex other than one's spouse or close family member)did not exist at the time?
No more than the fact that sacrifices were slaughtered and burned on Shabbat indicates that the laws of Shabbat were not in effect. It is a specific exemption to a general law.
Larry, you're probably right on both counts.
Larry, I've been giving your original comment further thought, and I'd like to go back to it:
"On Yayin Mevushal, I find that the effort involved in remembering to either buy only yayim mevushal, or at least to only serve yayin mevushal when necessary still does serve as a reminder that 'these people aren't exactly like me.'"
I have the same problem with Yayin M'vushal as an anti-fraternization measure that I have with Bishul Yisrael: The laws of kashrut (keeping kosher) already do that. It's my sincere opinion that making a practice (kashrut) that's already difficult even more so, especially for what I perceive as no good reason, is unwise.
You may be interested to know that I find the *other* reason for Yayin M'vushal--avoiding accidental participation in pagan worship--much more logical, though I'm not sure it's still relevant in our day.
Shira
Kashrut laws do a good job of making it difficult for me to eat in other people's homes. But it is no barrier to my socializing with people in my own home. Yayin mevushal allows these people to eat with me, but offers an at-the-time reminder that they are friends, but they aren't chaverim. Depending on the degree of friendship it actually makes it easier for me than just having stam yanim (ordinary wine) since my reminder can be invisible to less educated guests.
I wish I knew what purpose the original yayim mevushal (boiled wine) actually served, before there were these regulations. That would give me a better idea of what the rabbis were thinking with their exemption.
Incidentally, there are two separate categories of forbidden wine. Yayyin Nesach is wine that was prepared for use with idolatry. It is biblically forbidden to drink or even to benefit from. It is not nullified in any volume - a single drop of yayyin nesach in a barrel of kosher wine makes the entire barrel forbidden.
Stam yeinam (ordinary wine) is forbidden to be drunk if it has been touched or drunk by a gentile by rabbinical enactment. There is a debate about whether one is permitted to benefit from such wine.
Yayin mevushal was excluded from the category of Yayin nesech specifically because it was never offered on the gentile altars. Perhaps the rabbis thought that since the stricter prohibition nevertheless permitted this wine, their prohibition should do so as well?
We've come full circle, right back to my original point, which is that the Yayin M'vushal rule does not prevent fraternization, and, therefore, there's no reason to maintain it. As for Yayin Nesach, it's pretty irrelevant in the 21st century, and I don't see any point in maintaining the Yayin M'vushal rules as a work-around for a problem that no longer exists.
I didn't mention in my post that I'm unhappy with the Bishul Yisrael and Yayin M'vushal rules for another reason, which is that I see nothing wrong with mixing socially with non-Jews. Therefore, the original principle between these prohibitions doesn't sit well with me.
MS. Shira
With respect I think you'd make an excellent orthodox Jew.
I meant not to be offensive in my indignation regarding Rashi I'm sure in your ever attaining state, you surely enjoy Rashi.
Regarding the hair find out about On ben Pela a cohort of Korach.
Regarding the dissolving of a halacha the Rambam says that even if Elijah the prophet would decree that the rule is null and void one must still follow the halacha.
As Larry mentioned the fact that yayin nesech is discussed is enough to keep our awareness alive.
May I ask you see "nothing wrong with mixing socially with non-Jews."
If chas v'sholom your child arrived home one day announcing their engagement to a non Jew would you still feel that way?
"Mixing socially" is not equivalent to mixing maritally! Our son is our only child, so we have only a 50-50 chance of having halachically-Jewish grandchildren, and, since he's currently in grad. school, we're in the breath-holding phase.
"Regarding the dissolving of a halacha the Rambam says that even if Elijah the prophet would decree that the rule is null and void one must still follow the halacha."
I find that opinion quite discouraging. Are you still sure that I'd make an excellent Orthodox Jew?
Meh. The whole Elijah the Prophet thing is just polemics against false messianism, along the lines of what we got with Shabtai Zvi and Jacob Frank who perverted halacha.
My big issue with my fellow Orthos is that they don't have either senses of humor or irony. The bat kol saying "lo ba'shamayim hi" is not intended to be literal. It's a rhetorical device and is intended to convey a message, as with all aggadata.
JDub, thanks for the information.
As for the Bat Kol, story, *I* took it literally, too, and I'm not even Orthodox, so what was *my* excuse. :)
Now look what you made me do, JDub: I had to go find a link to the tale of the Bat Kol (divine voice), the Talmudic story of the Oven of Aknai, for my readers. :)
Shira: Now look at the resolution of the debate between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai. It was resolved by listening to the words of a Bat Kol. So why didn't Beit Shammai just say 'Lo BaShamyim Hi" and keep arguing?
Good question, Larry.
this is a really excellent post! i adore the *thinking* that you encourage while still being true and respectful of your beliefs! i also respect that you just put it all out there! now that's blog-commitment! well done, and thanks!
Thank you so much, Minnesota Mameleh! I try to be both true to my beliefs and respectful of the beliefs of others (though I don't always succeed), and encourage my readers to do likewise.
I brought the question up at the Shabbas table where I was eating Friday night. We had a lively discussion.
Some responses:
1) Beit Hillel and Shammai predate Rabbi Eliezar by quite a long time. It is possible this part of the mesorah was lost and then refound.
2) The bat kol in the Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai type intervened without being asked, while the Bat Kol for Rabbi Eliezer was dragged into the dispute by one of the parties.
3) The Bat Kol might be a metaphor for the will of the people. In the case of the 3 year debate between BH and BS by the end of the 3 years the people had adopted the rulings of BH, so BS conceded that they had lost. In the oven case the Sanhedrin was not willing to be stampeded by popular support for Rabbi E on a very technical question the populace wasn't particularly qualified for or impacted by.
Larry, thanks for the information. I've read elsewhere that parts of our tradition may have been lost and then re-found later, and I'm intrigued by that idea. I also appreciate the thought that the Bat Kol may represent the will of the people.
Larry, I should correct myself and say that the story of the Oven of Aknai was *a* story (not *the* story) of a Bat Kol, since there seems to be at least one more story of a Bat Kol--the Hillel/Shammai one to which you linked--in rabbinic literature.
One of the suggestions that people discussed around the table was that someone with access to a Bar Ilan CD and good Aramaic comprehension find all references to a Bat Kol in the Talmud and see if to how many the 'popular will' theory could apply. No volunteers at the table, alas.
I have just published a follow-up to this post, A Conservative Jew views Bishul Yisrael.
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